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ESTABLISHING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS TO
NATURAL RESOURCES IN OUTER SPACE*
Sarah Coffey†
This Note addresses the need for a stable legal framework to form a 
workable system that encourages the responsible exploration and exploita-
tion of resources from celestial bodies. Nations and private companies are 
eager to mine the moon because of its potential for commercial energy 
sources. However, without a stable legal framework, nations and companies 
are unlikely to fund such expensive mining operations. This Note analyzes 
proposals for a new system of rules to govern the mining and use of outer 
space resources, and concludes by proposing a new framework that encou-
rages exploration and mining while benefiting mankind as a whole. 
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INTRODUCTION
When the first space treaty entered into force in 1967, space explo-
ration was in its infancy. Only ten years had passed since Russia launched 
the first satellite into space, and only six years had passed since the first 
human orbited the Earth. Man’s first landing on the moon was still two 
years away. In the years since, there have been major developments in the 
exploration and use of space. Numerous countries have launched humans 
into space, nations have worked together to establish an international space 
station, and private companies have become important players in the field.  
Plans for the future are even more ambitious. Five nations have plans to go 
to the moon by 2020, and the United States plans to establish a permanently 
staffed base on the moon by 2024.1 Many of these missions plan to exploit 
resources from space for use during the missions and for broader use back 
on Earth. Despite these developments, few new space treaties have emerged 
since the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,2 and even fewer have been widely 
signed and ratified. Since the purpose of the Outer Space Treaty was to lay 
down only broad rules and principles, many specific issues in space law 
cannot be clearly resolved just by looking to that treaty.  
One issue that has been widely debated, and for which there is no 
clear legal framework, is the mining of celestial bodies. The moon, Mars, 
and other celestial bodies contain resources that are scarce or non-existent 
on Earth and which could have immense value. One example is helium-3, a 
substance common on the moon but exceedingly scarce on Earth.3  Helium-
3 has better potential for providing clean, efficient energy than any other 
source currently known on Earth.4 Nations and private companies are eager 
to mine this substance for use on Earth and in space. Without a stable legal 
framework in which legal rights and responsibilities are clearly outlined, 
however, these aspirations may not come to fruition. Nations and companies 
are unlikely to fund such expensive mining operations until they are assured 
that they will have a legal claim to what they extract. 
This Note addresses the need for a stable legal framework to form a 
workable system that encourages the responsible exploration and exploita-
tion of resources from celestial bodies while benefiting humanity as a 
whole. While this Note advocates that such a system should be applied to all 
celestial bodies, the examples in this Note focus on the moon—the only 
1 Mark Williams, Mining the Moon, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Aug. 23, 2007, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/Energy/19296. 
2 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].   
3 See HARRISON SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON 44 (2006).
4 Id. at 5, 44–47. 
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celestial body on which mining efforts are likely to commence in the near 
future. Part I addresses the potential uses of helium-3 and current plans to 
go to the moon. Part II discusses relevant space treaties currently in place, 
how the treaties address property rights in space, and what aspects of prop-
erty rights are left unclear. Part III addresses international mining treaties 
governing the high seas and Antarctica and how they can provide guidance 
in forming a mining agreement for outer space. Part IV analyzes ideas and 
proposals for a new system of rules to govern the mining and use of outer 
space resources. Finally, Part V proposes a framework for governing the 
mining and use of resources derived from outer space that encourages ex-
ploration and mining while benefiting mankind as a whole.  
I. LUNAR MINING
Space mining may seem like a distant prospect that presently does 
not require the creation of a special legal framework. Valuable resources 
found in outer space, however, have generated an intense interest in plan-
ning expeditions to exploit those resources. Though the cost of such an ex-
pedition would be high, the payoff in commercial quantities of natural re-
sources nonetheless makes it an appealing prospect. For example, a metallic 
asteroid only a kilometer in size would provide one billion tons of iron, two 
hundred million tons of nickel, ten million tons of cobalt, and twenty-
thousand tons of platinum, with a net market value of about one trillion U.S. 
dollars.5 The first mining expeditions in outer space will likely not be for 
minerals such as these that are commonly available on Earth, however.  
Rather, the cost and risk of a space mining expedition will likely be justified 
initially by the prospect of obtaining an exciting new potential energy 
source that is exceedingly rare on Earth: helium-3. 
A. Helium-3 
It is well known that on Earth, the supply of fossil fuels is limited 
and their extraction and use harms the environment.6 Researchers are look-
ing elsewhere for clean, efficient new energy sources. One that shows great 
promise is isotope helium-3, which in fusion reaction can create an ultra-
efficient, non-radioactive, clean source of energy.7 Only trace amounts of 
helium-3 have been found on Earth, however—not nearly enough to gener-
ate commercial power.8 Only the moon has the amounts necessary for 
5 See Ricky J. Lee, Creating an International Regime for Property Rights Under the 
Moon Agreement, in PROC. 42ND COLLOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE, 409, 409 (1999); infra 
text accompanying note 25.  
6 SCHMITT, supra note 3, at 31.
7 See Williams, supra note 1. 
8 SCHMITT, supra note 3.
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commercial use.9 In fusion reaction, the moon’s estimated helium-3 re-
sources could produce ten times as much energy as is contained in the 
Earth’s recoverable coal, oil, and gas combined.10   
The mining operation could be a significant undertaking. Even 
though helium-3 is much more abundant on the moon than on Earth, it only 
found in quantities of about twenty-five parts per billion on the lunar sur-
face.11 While hundreds of millions of tons of lunar soil must be mined to 
extract one ton of helium-3, only a very small amount of helium-3 is needed 
to create a vast amount of power in fusion reaction, so much so that a single 
ounce of helium-3 is valued at $40,000.12
Some critics argue, though, that helium-3 is not a feasible option us-
ing standard reactors.13 Currently there is only one helium-3 fusion reactor 
in the world.14 It is a small scale, basketball-sized reactor located at the Fu-
sion Technology Institute at University of Wisconsin—Madison, and not 
nearly large enough to produce commercial power.15 The reactor currently 
consumes more power than it produces, but the institute’s work has shown 
that helium-3 fusion reaction is possible.16 For the past fifty years, fusion 
researchers have been trying to reach the break-even point at which a reac-
tor produces more energy than it consumes, and it seems the break-even 
point is now in sight.17 The eight billion dollar International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor currently under construction in France is widely re-
garded as the last step before the design of commercial fusion reactors.18
Scientist and Apollo 17 astronaut Harrison Schmitt, a champion of lunar 
mining for helium-3, estimates that it will take ten to fifteen years to devel-
op commercial fusion plant technology.19
Helium-3’s incredible potential as an energy source in an efficient 
reactor coupled with its value—1.4 million dollars per kilogram when com-
pared to the value and energy potential of oil—have made it a source of 
9 See Williams, supra note 1. 
10 Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 61 (1999). 
11 SCHMITT, supra note 3.  
12 See id. 
13 See Williams, supra note 1. 
14 See id. 
15 John Lasker, Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel, WIRED, Dec. 15, 2006, http://www 
.wired.com/science/space/news/2006/12/72276?currentPage=all.  
16 See Williams, supra note 1. 
17 See JOHN S. LEWIS, MINING THE SKY 136 (1997).  
18 Id.  Information on the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor’s progress 
and a current timeline are available at http://www.iter.org/index.htm.  
19 David Brown, Lunar Land Rights, AAPG EXPLORER, Aug. 2003, http://www.aapg.org 
/explorer/2003/08aug/moonexpl.cfm.  
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keen interest among nations and private companies alike.20 Used in an effi-
cient fusion reactor, helium-3’s market value will be one thousand times its 
weight in gold or platinum, making it the most valuable known raw material 
in the solar system.21 As a result, nations and private companies have an 
intense interest in going to the moon and extracting this valuable resource. 
B. Missions to the Moon 
Currently, at least six nations and numerous private companies have 
plans to go to the moon in the near future. NASA’s Vision for Space Explo-
ration aims to send astronauts back to the moon in 2020 and to establish a 
permanently staffed base by 2024.22 While NASA has not stated that the 
purpose of the mission is to mine helium-3, it has placed helium-3 mining 
advocates in influential positions.23 Additionally, NASA’s published Lunar 
Exploration Objectives include using lunar resources to establish alternative 
energy sources for Earth, including mining helium-3 from the lunar sur-
face.24 In this document, NASA describes the value of obtaining helium-3 
by saying: 
Utilizing energy produced on the moon can reduce Earth’s reliance on fos-
sil fuels (including petroleum, coal, and natural gas) and the associated 
emission of greenhouse gasses and other pollutants on Earth.  This can im-
prove productivity (value per unit cost) associated with activities on the 
lunar surface; improve the economic sustainability of lunar activities, sup-
port permanent human presence and settlement on the moon, and reduce 
the cost of lunar activities.  This activity may encourage investment in 
space infrastructures by private institutions and others to generate wealth 
on Earth and on the Moon.25
Other nations have similar goals. China plans to land an unmanned 
vehicle on the moon in 2011.26 Luan Enjie, director of the China National 
Aerospace Administration, has said that developing and using lunar miner-
als and energy resources for the sustainable development of human society 
“is the most important driving force to return to the moon.”27 He singled out 
the potential use of the moon’s helium-3 as a new energy source, stating 
20 See SCHMITT, supra note 3. 
21 LEWIS, supra note 17, at 210. 
22 Williams, supra note 1. 
23 Id. 
24 See NASA Lunar Exploration Objectives, Dec. 2006, at 38, available at http://www.na
sa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/mmb/why_moon_objectives.html. 
25 Id. 
26 Williams, supra note 1. 
27 Leonard David, China Outlines its Lunar Ambitions, SPACE.COM, Mar. 4 2003,  
http://www.space.com.missionlaunches/china_moon_030304.html. 
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that is a “clean, efficient, safe and cheap new-type nuclear fusion fuel for 
mankind’s future long-term use, and it will help change the energy structure 
of human society.”28 Similarly, India wants to land a rover on the lunar sur-
face in 2010 or 2011, and its president, A.P.J. Kalam, and prime minister, 
Manmohan Singh, made major speeches in 2007 announcing that India in-
tends to mine helium-3 from the lunar surface.29 Germany and Japan have 
also announced their interest in launching moon missions in a similar time-
frame and in exploring the possibility of mining helium-3.30
Additionally, private ventures have stated their intention to go to the 
moon and mine helium-3. Energia, a Russian space corporation, in 2006, 
announced plans to build a permanent base on the moon by 2015 and to 
begin industrial-scale delivery of helium-3 by 2020.31 Both public and pri-
vate ventures will face significant risks in mining helium-3 from the moon.  
These include the financial risks of funding such an expensive operation and 
the safety risks associated with sending manned missions to the moon.  
Equally risky may be the uncertain legal framework that currently governs 
the resources of celestial bodies. The success of any approach to lunar min-
ing requires supportive regulatory, treaty, and political environments.32
II. TREATIES
While both public and private ventures are racing to use the moon’s 
resources, the laws governing those resources have remained vague and 
unchanged for many years. The United Nations created an Office for Outer 
Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in 1958.33 UNOOSA represents the only interna-
tional forum for the development of international space laws.34 UNOOSA 
has concluded five major space treaties, all opening for signature between 
1967 and 1979.35 All of these treaties were concluded during the Cold War 
and reflect Cold War fears and ambitions, with significantly less emphasis 
on modern day concerns about space resources, commercialization, and 
production.36 The fact that a generation has passed since the last major 
28 Id. 
29 Williams, supra note 1. 
30 Id. 
31 Russia Plans Mine on the Moon by 2020, MOON DAILY, Jan. 25, 2006, 
http://www.moondaily.com/reports/Russia_Plans_Mine_On_The_Moon_By_2020.html. 
32 SCHMITT, supra note 3, at 275–76. 
33 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/OOSA 
/index.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
34 United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en 
/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
35 Id. 
36 See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the 
Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2004). 
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space treaty was concluded, even as science, technology, and space explora-
tion have raced ahead, indicates that nations are in disagreement over how 
to resolve new issues that have arisen since Cold War fears dissipated and 
new ambitions became the focus of progress in space. 
Two of the space treaties currently in place can be interpreted to en-
compass property rights to natural resources in space: the Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Out-
er Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space 
Treaty or OST),37 and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement or Moon Treaty).38
In analyzing property rights to natural resources in space, the successes and 
failures of these treaties can provide insight into identifying unresolved is-
sues, the priorities of the relevant parties, and possible compromises.    
A. The Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on interna-
tional space law.39 It declares that outer space is free for exploration and use 
by all states, that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes, that outer space is not subject to national ap-
propriation by claim of sovereignty, and that the exploration and use of out-
er space shall be carried of for the benefit and interest of all countries and 
shall be the province of all mankind.40 These broad principles deny control 
of outer space to any single power.41 This treaty thus addressed Cold War 
concerns about nations claiming space and celestial bodies as their own 
territory and using them to station weapons for use against other countries.42
It does little, however, to address modern day concerns about obtaining and 
claiming resources from outer space and celestial bodies. 
Article II of the OST forbids national appropriation of outer space, 
the moon, and other celestial bodies.43 At the same time, however, the treaty 
promotes the “exploration and use” of outer space and celestial bodies. The 
term “use” seems to indicate that a public or private entity may own re-
sources extracted from the territory as long as it does not claim sovereignty 
37 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2. 
38 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].   
39 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Outer Space Treaty Overview, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).  
40 Id.   
41 Reinstein, supra note 10, at 66 (citation omitted). 
42 See Gabrynowicz, supra note 36.   
43 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. II. 
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over the land.44 This idea is supported by the fact that the treaty explicitly 
states activities that are forbidden (such as using space for military purpos-
es) and mining or owning natural resources is not one of the forbidden ac-
tivities.45 The six Apollo missions to the moon brought back a total of 842 
pounds of lunar material, over which the United States has had exclusive 
dominion and control for over thirty years.46 There has been no claim that 
removing those resources and declaring ownership of them constituted a 
breach of any international law.47 The actions are apparently in compliance 
with the OST because the United States claims to own the rocks but not the 
lunar surface from which its astronauts removed them.  At the least, this has 
set customary international law that resources removed from the moon may 
be owned.48
The provision of the OST that perhaps has generated the most de-
bate is article I, which states, “[t]he exploration and use of outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the ben-
efit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of eco-
nomic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all man-
kind.”49 The wording of this provision leaves much room for debate. Use 
“for the benefit . . . of all countries” can be seen as a non-binding guide to 
encourage the sharing of knowledge and resources, or it can be viewed as a 
binding legal mandate for the redistribution of wealth derived from space.50
Even if the provision does require sharing benefits, the OST does 
not stipulate how to do so, who makes decisons, and how much is to be 
shared. One approach is to view the OST is a non-self-executing treaty, so 
nations may interpret this obligation themselves and individually determine 
how much they believe their appropriate obligation to be.51 Another ap-
proach is to say that after recouping expenses, profits and benefits should be 
split evenly among nations, with the nation who made the mission receiving 
no more than those who played no part in it.52 Using lunar resources to 
create cleaner, more efficient energy on Earth, or to support exploration and 
settlement in space could arguably comply with the treaty’s requirement 
44 See SCHMITT, supra note 3, at 282. 
45 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV. 
46 See EDWARD L. HUDGINS, SPACE: THE FREE MARKET FRONTIER 228–29 (2002). 
47 See id. at 229. 
48 See id.
49 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I 
50 See Reinstein, supra note 10, at 67. 
51 See Edwin Paxson, Note, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration, 14 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 487, 492–93 (1993). 
52 See id. at 495–96. 
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that lunar activities be carried out “for the benefit and in the interest of all 
countries” even though the benefit is indirect.53
Given the different possible interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty, the 
OST appears too ambiguous to provide clear guidelines governing nations’ 
and companys’ rights and responsibilities in extracting helium-3 from the 
lunar surface or any other resource from any celestial body.  Another in-
ternational agreement must be made to clarify the legal status of these re-
sources so that future missions may act within an accepted legal frame-
work.  Otherwise, the lack of a legal framework may deter nations and 
companies not willing to gamble on spending millions or billions of dol-
lars on missions to collect resources that they may not legally own.  Per-
haps equally worrisome, there is the risk that missions undertaken without 
a clear legal framework will set bad precedent and form customary inter-
national law regarding exploitation of resources that the international 
community had no say in, yet which could be difficult to overturn. 
B. The Moon Agreement 
The Moon Agreement was an attempt to create a framework to go-
vern property claims to resources in space. It was intended to reaffirm and 
elaborate on the Outer Space Treaty, clarify legal rights and responsibilities 
and establish an international regime for the exploitation of resources on the 
moon and other celestial bodies.54 Though extensively debated, all space-
faring nations and most of the rest of the international community rejected 
the Moon Agreement.55 Although the Moon Agreement opened for signa-
tures in 1979, it did not enter into force until 1984 when it was ratified by a 
fifth country.56  It is currently binding only on the thirteen nations that have 
ratified it.57 The Moon Agreement is, in effect, a failed treaty because no 
nation that has ever performed a manned space flight is bound by it.58
53 SCHMITT, supra note 3, at 282. 
54 See U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, Moon Agreement Overview,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/moon.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
55 See Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law Into the Com-
mercial World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 85 (2005). 
56 Moon Agreement Overview, supra note 54. 
57 U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer 
Space and Other Related General Assembly Resolutions, add. at 8–16, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SPACE/11/Rev.1/Add.1/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/p 
ublications/ST_SPACE_11_Rev1_Add1_Rev1E.pdf (showing that the Moon Agreement has 
been ratified by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, and Uruguay while France, Guatamala, India, and 
Romania are signatories but have not yet ratified the treaty).   
58 See Elizabeth Svoboda, Who Owns the Moon?, SALON, Jan. 19, 2008, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/01/19/moon_real_estate/ 
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Still, the Moon Agreement is important to consider because of the reasons 
that it failed. For any future agreement to be meaningful, it will need wide-
spread acceptance and must be ratified by major space-faring nations. By 
analyzing the reasons for the space-faring nations’ refusal to sign the 
Moon Agreement, we might determine what provisions they find essential 
to a workable treaty and find ways to balance their interests with the inter-
ests of other nations. 
The major reason that space-faring nations rejected the Moon 
Agreement was that it prohibited property rights and declared celestial bo-
dies and their resources “the common heritage of mankind.”59 The agree-
ment called for an “international regime” to oversee space activities and 
determine how benefits and profits derived from space would be distributed 
among the nations of the world.60 This was undesirable to nations with 
space programs because the international regime would include member 
nations without space programs, who might make unwise business decisions 
because they do not bear any risk.61 For instance, those nations might decide 
to heavily tax space activities knowing that their countries would not have 
to pay the tax but would receive a cut of the proceeds from it.  Smaller, non-
space-faring nations would have a great incentive to use their position to 
gain monetary and technological advances at the expense of the nations 
actually going to space.62
No further treaties have been ratified since the Moon Agreement 
that have attempted to resolve the issue of private property in outer space 
resources.63 As nations and companies make plans to go to the moon and 
mine helium-3, it becomes increasingly important for new proposals to be 
raised for an agreement that not only abides by the principles set out from 
the Outer Space Treaty, but also resolves the issues that led so many nations 
to refuse to sign the Moon Agreement.    
III. ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS
In attempting to establish a system for lunar mining, it is helpful to 
look to analogous situations in international law to consider the issues de-
59 See Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind 
Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689, 699 (2004). 
60 See Moon Agreement, supra note 38, art. 11.   
61 See 4 Frontiers, Space Law, http://www.4frontierscorp.com/areasoffocus/space_law.php 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
62 See id. 
63 The U.N. (through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) is the only 
forum for the development of international space law, and the Moon Treaty was the last of 
the U.N. space treaties to be ratified. See United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space 
Law, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
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bated and how they were resolved. While the moon may be the most re-
markable subject of an international mining debate, international mining 
treaties have been concluded regarding the oceans and Antarctica. Although 
terrestrial, these areas have much in common with the moon. They can be 
harsh environments that are difficult to reach to extract minerals. They are 
also designated international areas in which no nation has a sovereign claim.  
Since the mining debate was resolved in dramatically different ways in the 
high seas and in Antarctica, these examples illustrate the drastically differ-
ent arguments being presented and conclusions that may be reached in an 
international debate on lunar mining. 
A. The Law of the Sea 
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III or Convention) establishes a comprehensive regime of law 
for the world’s oceans and seas.64 The Convention is the result of the partic-
ipation of over 150 nations after more than fourteen years of work.65 The 
wide participation and long debate indicate the importance that nations put 
on resolving the issues of international waters.  
A major focus of this debate was the question of who should benefit 
from the oceans’ resources, including mineral-rich nodules that had been 
discovered on the seabed. Technologically advanced, sea-faring nations felt 
that the resources should become the property of the nation that extracted 
them.66 Smaller nations without the capabilities or funds to launch expedi-
tions felt that the profits and benefits of the resources should be shared 
among all nations, since the high seas are international territory belonging 
equally to all nations.67 This divide is strikingly similar to that between 
space-faring nations and non-space-faring nations in the debate over lunar 
resources. 
UNCLOS III established that the international seabed is the com-
mon heritage of mankind, not subject to appropriation by any state, and 
stated that all rights to mineral resources shall be vested in mankind as a 
whole, with economic benefits from mining to be shared for the benefit of 
mankind.68 Part XI of the Convention established an International Seabed 
Authority (ISA) to regulate and oversee the extraction of seabed resources 
64 Law of the Sea Convention Overview, United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_over 
view_convention.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
65 Id.   
66 See Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth 
to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 34–35 (2005).  
67 See Buxton, supra note 59, at 694.   
68 Id. at 695. 
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from international waters.69 Developed nations such as the United States 
were concerned that the “common heritage of mankind” as applied in 
UNCLOS III seemed to indicate that nations that do not contribute finan-
cially or technologically to the extraction of resources would reap the bene-
fit of such activity, reducing the incentive for capable nations to fund re-
search and development.70  The United States said that the common heritage 
principle and ISA would deter private mining companies from seeking li-
censes, impede the development of seabed mineral resources, deny national 
access, and create a monopoly by an international authority.71 According to 
estimates from one U.S. consortium, it would take ten years and $1.5 billion 
to start up the seabed mining industry, time and money unlikely to be in-
vested unless profits and a mining site are guaranteed.72
In response to these concerns, in 1994 the United Nations opened 
for signature the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Agreement), funda-
mentally changing the mining provisions of UNCLOS III to make it more 
acceptable to developed nations, particularly the United States.73 The 
Agreement recognized previous U.S. claims to mining sites, guaranteed the 
U.S. a seat on the ISA Council, and ensured that a market-oriented approach 
would be used in managing seabed resources.74 While the U.S. has signed 
the Agreement, the Senate has not yet ratified the convention.75
Important lessons can be learned from UNCLOS III that should be 
considered when approaching lunar mining. First, it shows that nations are 
willing to work together to establish order and regulation in the extraction 
of natural resources from international territory. Though nations differ in 
69 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 156, 157, concluded Dec. 10 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].   
70 See Buxton, supra note 59, at 693. 
71 See Hamilton DeSaussure,  The Freedoms of Outer Space and their Maritime Antece-
dents, in SPACE LAW, DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 11 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, ed. 1992).   
72 See id.   
73 See U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet 96/03/19: U.S. 
Oceans Policy & Law of the Sea Convention, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/environment/f 
act_sheets/960319.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
74 Id. 
75 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly voted to approve the Law of 
the Sea Convention on October 17, 2007, but it is still waiting for ratification by a vote of the 
full Senate. Press Release, Richard G. Lugar, United States Senator, Law of the Sea Clears 
Committee, available at http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/sea.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). The 
following nations have not ratified UNCLOS III: Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, North Korea, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, Estonia, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, 
Niue, Peru, Syria, Thailand, East Timor, Turkey, United States, Venezuela, and 21 lan-
dlocked states including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Niger. See Status of UNCLOS, July 16, 
2008, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2007.pdf (listing the status of 
UNCLOS for all countries).  
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their ultimate goals, there is a consensus among nations that international 
cooperation is needed and that no nation may act without regard to the other 
nations of the world. The Agreement shows that nations would rather com-
promise and act within the framework of international law than to disregard 
it entirely. The fourteen-year process of negotiating the treaty, however, 
should be a warning that an agreement will not be easy to reach and that the 
issue of lunar mining needs to be addressed immediately if there is to be an 
established legal framework by the time lunar mining begins. 
B. Antarctic Treaty 
International mining law regarding Antarctica also illustrates poten-
tial issues that may arise in building a legal framework for lunar mining. 
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 established Antarctica as an area reserved for 
international scientific research and environmental preservation.76 The An-
tarctica treaty, however, left many issues unsettled, and as a result Antarcti-
ca’s legal framework has continued to evolve over time in a series of addi-
tional treaties and agreements.   
Among the issues nations have addressed is mining in Antarctica.  
In the 1980s, although no mineral deposits of commercial interest had yet 
been discovered, nations wanted to create a framework to guide future deci-
sions regarding whether and under what circumstance Antarctic minerals 
should be extracted.77 There was concern that if a major mineral discovery 
was made before an international agreement was made, nations would ex-
ploit it without the benefit of regulation, which could result in harm to both 
the environment and the Arctic Treaty System.78 As a result, the United 
States and other parties to the Antarctic Treaty launched negotiations to 
establish guidelines for mineral resource activities.79
In 1988, the parties signed the Convention on the Regulation of An-
tarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), which allowed for nation-
ally sponsored mineral exploration and mining while protecting the envi-
ronment.80 It did not contain a detailed mining code but instead stated that 
mining activities would be regulated and fees would be collected and used 
76 Buxton, supra note 59, at 696. 
77 See U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 101ST CONG., POLAR PROSPECTS: A
MINERALS TREATY FOR ANTARCTICA 3 (1989). 
78 See id. The nineteen parties to CRAMRA were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Cze-
choslovakia, Denmark, Finland, East Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Swe-
den, South Africa, South Korea, the USSR, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. 
See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Minerals, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-International-Law/01-Treaties-for-which-
NZ-is-Depositary/0-Antarctic-Mineral-Resource.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
79 U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 77. 
80 See SCHMITT, supra note 3, at 279. 
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for Antarctic purposes.81 This convention, however, was short-lived.  De-
spite the CRAMRA’s strict environmental protections, Australia and France 
declined to ratify the convention, stating that mining should not be permit-
ted in Antarctica at all.82 Only three years later, in October 1991, a separate 
protocol superceded the convention. The Protocol on Environmental Protec-
tion to the Antarctic Treaty (Protocol) designated Antarctica a natural re-
serve and prohibited mineral resource activity except for scientific re-
search.83 The Protocol bans exploitation of mineral resources indefinitely 
and the terms of the Protocol cannot be reviewed until 2048, fifty years 
from the year it entered into force (1998).84
Lessons learned from the Antarctic agreements should be consi-
dered in forming a future lunar mining agreement. CRAMRA took seven 
years to negotiate and was superceded three years later. This is an indication 
that forming the right mining regime would be a long process and that the 
goals may evolve over time. In the end, the parties to the Protocol agreed to 
ban Antarctic mining, and at present the ban has not been violated.85 The 
Antarctic debate resulting in a prohibition on mining, however, does not 
indicate that the lunar mining debate should likewise be resolved with a ban.   
Unlike Antarctica, important resources have been discovered on the 
moon in commercial quantities. These resources are not merely a potentially 
lucrative find but could present a new, clean, and efficient energy alterna-
tive for the world. If such a discovery had been made in Antarctica, it is 
likely that the mining prohibition never would have been ratified.86 If such a 
find were discovered in Antarctica now, nations would have incentive to 
break the treaty and, with no regulatory regime binding the nations’ mining 
activities, they might wreak havoc on the environment.87 To prevent a simi-
lar prospect on the moon in the future, we must establish a set legal frame-
work that allows regulated lunar mining before that mining begins. 
81 Id.  
82 Antarctica New Zealand Information Sheet, Mining Issues in Antarctica, Aug. 2003, 
http://www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/downloads/information/infosheets/mining.pdf. 
83 See SCHMITT, supra note 3, at 279.  
84 See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 25, opened for 
signature Oct. 4, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-22, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (entered into force Jan. 
14, 1998).  
85 See Australian Antarctic Division, http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=6561 (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2009) (stating that the only drilling in Antarctica has been for scientific pur-
poses).
86 See SCHMITT, supra note 3, at 279–80.
87 See id. 
2009] PROPERTY RIGHTS IN OUTER SPACE 133
IV. PROPOSALS
A number of proposals for a new legal framework to govern re-
sources from outer space have been set forth by commentators in the fields 
of law and space. These plans demonstrate how varied the possibilities in 
the field are and illustrate the types of compromises that will need to be 
made to resolve these differences. This section highlights the proposals that 
seem most capable of contributing to a workable framework for lunar min-
ing, while noting each proposal’s individual drawbacks and deficiencies.  
While in many cases it seems that the only thing the proponents agree on is 
that a new framework is needed, it may be possible to combine the best 
elements of each proposal in order to create a strong new legal framework 
without the drawbacks that the proposals create individually. 
A. International Regime 
One theory for how to best create a framework for rights to natural 
resources in space is to create a new international body to establish the laws 
governing outer space, oversee those laws, and enforce them. This proposal 
aligns with article 11(5) of the Moon Agreement, which requires that an 
international regime be created to govern the exploitation of natural re-
sources on the moon when such exploitation is about to become feasible.88
The Moon Agreement gave no further guidance on how this was to be done 
or what form it should take, leading many developed and space-faring na-
tions to reject the proposal for fear that they would be bound to obey a body 
that would not act in their best interests.89  Modern proposals seek to clarify 
the shape that such an international regime would take. 
Professor Carl Christol, one of the foremost authorities in interna-
tional space law, argues that an intergovernmental organization is necessary 
to manage and ensure the safe and orderly exploitation of lunar resources.90
He believes that such an organization is the best and perhaps only way to 
maintain open channels of communication among public and private institu-
tions that seek to use lunar resources.91  He further believes that an intergo-
vernmental organization could take into consideration both views when 
deciding equitable distribution of shares from the profits and other benefits 
derived from the exploitation of outer space resources.92
88 See Moon Agreement, supra note 38, art. 11(5). 
89 Space Law, supra note 61.   
90 Paxson, supra note 51, at 509; Carl Christol, An International Regime for the Moon,
Article 11, Paragraph 5 of the 1979 moon Treaty for the Moon, PROC. 23RD COLLOQUIUM ON 
L. OUTER SPACE, 139, 146 (1980).  
91 See Christol, supra note 90. 
92 Id. Paxson, supra note 51, at 509. 
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In creating a legal framework to govern the exploitation of natural 
resources in space, it would be natural to look to international law currently 
governing mining in international territories on Earth, and to draw inspira-
tion for an international space authority from other international administra-
tive bodies already in place. The International Seabed Authority is one pro-
totype that may be followed. Created under UNCLOS III, the ISA oversees 
the extraction of resources from international territory (in the ISA’s case, 
mining in international waters).93 UNCLOS designated international sea-
beds the “common heritage of mankind,”94 similar to the OST’s designation 
that space is to be explored and used for the benefit and in the interest of all 
mankind.95
The ISA administers rules and regulations for deep-sea mining, ap-
proves plans for exploration and exploitation of resources, oversees com-
pliance with rules, and decides how mining revenues should be shared.96
The ISA is divided into separate bodies with designated functions.  Every 
party to UNCLOS is represented in the Assembly, which makes decisions 
about sharing mining revenues and considers problems of a general nature.97
The Assembly appoints seats in the ISA’s executive body, the Council, to 
ensure that both developing nations and those with a substantial interest in 
mining are represented.98  Remaining seats are distributed to assure equita-
ble geographic distribution.99
Nations or companies do not need the ISA’s permission to prospect 
for resources but must obtain permission to have exclusive rights to the ex-
ploration and exploitation of discovered resources.100 The ISA requires all 
mining applications submitted to it to encompass an area large enough to 
support two mining operations, so that a portion of that area may be re-
served for the ISA’s potential future use for the ISA’s own mining expedi-
tions.101 If more than one proposal is submitted for the same area and autho-
rizing multiple requests would exceed production limits, the ISA must select 
the application to authorize in a non-discriminatory manner, giving priority 
to the applicant who gives the better assurance of performance.102
93 See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 69.  
94 See id. art. 136.  
95 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I. 
96 See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 69, arts. 160, 162. 
97 See id. arts. 159–160. 
98 See id. art. 161. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. Annex III, arts. 2–3.  
101 See id. Annex III, art. 8. 
102 See id. Annex III, art. 7.  
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Since the ISA was established in 1994, it has successfully estab-
lished new regulations for marine mineral resource prospecting and explora-
tion.103 It has entered into fifteen-year exploration contracts with seven na-
tions104 to reserve areas to prospect exclusively.105 So far, these nations have 
not begun to exploit deep-sea minerals.106 Any disputes relating to ISA ac-
tivities will be submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber,107 which is a 
court within the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea.108 So far, only 
fifteen cases have been submitted to the Tribunal, and none of the cases 
have involved mining.109
A space authority that follows the ISA model may be divided into 
different bodies that carry out different functions. All nations would have a 
seat in the Assembly, regardless of their space-faring capabilities. Represen-
tation on boards and councils would depend on the nations’ space-faring 
capacity and plans to send missions to space and exploit resources. If the 
ISA model is followed exactly, seats on the Council will be reserved so that 
developing countries have representation. It is likely, however, that power-
ful space-faring nations would only agree to this model if seats reserved to 
developing nations were very limited.110 Some nations may argue that only 
those nations that will be performing the missions falling under the authori-
ty’s jurisdiction should be guaranteed a role in approving and implementing 
the rules and regulations on the Council.111 The ISA model would allow 
parties to search freely for resources but would require them to abide by the 
ISA’s rules in claiming and extracting resources. The space authority could 
103 See UNITED NATIONS & THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, MARINE MINERAL 
RESOURCES 9 (2004). 
104 The nations are India, France, Japan, Russia, China, Korea, and the Czech Republic. Id. 
at 9 n. 25. 
105 See Reserved Areas, International Seabed Authority, http://www.isa.org.jm/en/scientifi
c/exploration/reserved (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
106 See Members, International Seabed Authority, http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about/members 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2008) (“The Convention also assigns several other powers to the Au-
thority, which will come into play once deep-sea mineral exploitation gets under way.”). 
107 See Proceedings and Judgments: Competence, International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
108 See Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The Tribunal Con-
cludes its First Session & Organizes its Future Work (Nov. 1, 1996), available at
http://www.itlos.org/news/press_release/1996/press_release_4_en.doc.  
109 See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html 
(follow “Proceedings and Judgments” link; then follow “List of Cases” link) (last visited Jan. 
14, 2009). 
110 The amount of control given to developing nations is a major reason the UNCLOS III 
and ISA were rejected by some nations, including the United States.  See Sattler, supra note 
66, at 34–35. 
111 See id.
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levy a production royalty on the operations and might be free to impose fees 
as it felt necessary. Additionally, it could, as the ISA did, reserve a portion 
of every area approved for mining either by the space authority itself or to 
sell or rent to other interested parties to generate profits for itself or to dis-
tribute among non-space-faring nations. 
There are drawbacks to forming a new international body to oversee 
the exploitation of space resources. An international authority would be 
very expensive to start and maintain.  Most nations do not have the capacity 
to perform lunar missions, so they may not want to invest much money in 
the authority. This could effectively freeze them out of the decsionmaking 
process and put them at a disadvantage if they someday are able to partici-
pate in lunar missions.112 There is also questionable value in creating a 
structure which is supposed to allocate profits and benefits to developing 
countries but which consumes funds that might have otherwise been put 
toward helping those nations directly.113   
It may also be difficult for space-faring nations and developing na-
tions to come to an agreement on how the international body should be set 
up and administered, even before they address the actual space law issues at 
hand in the international regime. They will need to decide whether the au-
thority should be administered by the United Nations or exist as an inde-
pendent entity and how to allocate power between developing nations and 
space-faring ones. Judging by the fourteen years it took to negotiate the ISA 
(with an additional twelve months before it came into force),114 creation and 
implementation of a governing body could take many years, and thus the 
space authority may not be in place before missions are sent to the moon to 
begin assessing and mining resources. 
B. Credit System 
A credit trading system might avoid the problems associated with 
creating a new international body to govern space resources. In a 1993 Uni-
versity of Michigan Law Review Note, Edwin Paxson first proposed apply-
ing the credit trading system of the Montreal Protocol to space mining.115
Since that time, the use of credit systems has greatly increased and been 
applied in areas as diverse as emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol,116
112 See Reinstein, supra note 10, at 64. 
113 See Paxson, supra note 51, at 510. 
114 See Law of the Sea Convention Overview, supra note 64. 
115 See Paxson, supra note 51, at 513–14. 
116 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 ILM 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].   
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landfill allowance trading in the United Kingdom,117 and fishing and water 
credits.118 Given expanded use of the credit system over the past fifteen 
years, a credit system’s possible application to lunar mining should be re-
examined. 
Under the emissions trading systems of the Montreal and Kyoto 
Protocols, the parties seek to reduce global emissions of substances that 
deplete the ozone layer and cause climate change by allowing each party a 
designated amount of emissions per time period.119 The regimes allow par-
ties to purchase emission allowances from other parties, so that if one nation 
wants to use more than its allotted shares, it may purchase them from a na-
tion that did not use all of its shares.120 Thus, emissions levels are kept sta-
ble by nations buying and selling the emissions credits among themselves, 
eliminating the need for an international body’s consideration and approval 
for every proposed transaction.121 Emissions trading programs have been 
very successful, leading dozens of countries to adopt programs to address 
global warming.122
While most famous credit trading schemes such as the Kyoto Proto-
col have focused on limiting emissions that are released into the air and 
water as pollution, a similar system can also be used for extracting and own-
ing limited natural resources. Tradable credit systems have been applied to 
water resources, fisheries, and land control.123 Tom Tietenberg, professor of 
economics at Colby College, explains how to apply this system to extraction 
rather than emission: 
117 The U.K. government allocated to local authorities landfill allowances of tons of gar-
bage that they may send to landfills each year.  See generally Friends of the Earth, U.K. 
Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme Briefing, Sept. 2007, available at
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/lats.pdf (describing an overview of the U.K. Landfill 
Allowance Trading Scheme).  Local authorities may trade their credits among themselves if 
they have more or fewer credits than they need. Id.
118 See Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: 
What Have We Learned?, at 1, presented at the Conference of the International Association 
for the Study of Common Property, Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Com-
mons in the New Millennium, 2000, available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/0000036 
6/00/tietenbergt040800.pdf.    
119 See Press Release, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Montreal 
Protocol and Kyoto Protocol are Mutually Supportive (Sept. 17, 2007), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/07091
7_hcfc_pressrel.pdf.
120 See The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art 2.5, Jan. 1, 
1989, 26 I.L.M. 1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
121 Paxson, supra note 51, at 515. 
122 See David B. Sandalow, Emissions Trading is Kyoto’s Success Story, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Feb. 17, 2005, at 8, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/02/16/opinion/edsa
ndalow.php.
123 See Tietenberg, supra note 118. 
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Tradable permits address the commons problem by rationing access to the 
resource and privatizing the resulting access rights. The first step involves 
setting a limit on user access to the resource . . . . For water supply it 
would involve the amount of water that could be extracted . . . . This limit 
defines the aggregate amount of access to the resource that is authorized.  
These access rights are then allocated . . . to potential individual users. . . . 
[R]ights may be transferable to other users and/or bankable for future use.  
Users who exceed limits imposed by the rights they hold face penalties up 
to and including the loss of the right to participate.124   
By applying this model to lunar resources, all party nations, regard-
less of space-faring capacity, would be allocated a certain number of lunar 
mining credits. The credits would allow the holder to mine a certain tonnage 
of natural resources on the moon during a given period.125 The tonnage limit 
assures that nations will make careful choices in where and what to mine, 
and assures that resources will be available to all nations that begin mining 
later.126 Setting a date on which the credits expire prevents hoarding and 
controls the amount of mining activity happening at a given time. Nations 
could buy and sell their credits freely among nations that are parties to the 
credit agreement. This would create incentive for all nations to participate in 
the agreement regardless of their individual space-faring capacities. In addi-
tion, it would allow developing nations to benefit from space exploration 
and exploitation fairly, without giving them control over an international 
regime in which they might devise a system to distribute profits from re-
sources that they played no part in obtaining and which they might skew 
unfairly in their own favor.127 Little international organization would be 
needed to administer this system because countries could buy and sell the 
credits among themselves.128
This system is not without problems. First, a limited international 
authority would be needed to allocate the mining credits. The authority 
would need to decide how to allot credits: by population, by giving addi-
tional credits to developing countries to ensure they benefit, or by some 
other fashion. Since credits would be bought and sold among nations, it is 
unclear what role private actors such as corporations would play. It must be 
decided whether individuals may purchase credits directly from nations, or 
whether a citizen would have to obtain credits from his or her own nation.  
124 Id. 
125 Paxson, supra note 51, at 514. 
126 See id. 
127 See KEMAL BASLAR, THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 
(1998) (demonstrating the concern of developing nations during negotiations for the Moon 
Agreement).
128 Paxson, supra note 51, at 515. 
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Some international oversight would be needed to ensure that nations adhere 
to the rules and do not exceed their allotted tonnage. This plan also does not 
resolve the fundamental questions of whether space resources may legally 
be claimed as personal property. While the plan assumes that they may, an 
international agreement would still be needed to firmly establish that celes-
tial resources may legally belong to those who extract them. 
C. Unlimited Ownership  
Perhaps the clearest, most efficient solution to the space resources 
question would simply be to allow comprehensive property rights, including 
real estate ownership, in space. Supporters of this theory believe that prop-
erty rights under the current Outer Space Treaty are unworkable. The OST 
seems to indicate that people may use real property in space to collect re-
sources and claim those resources as their own property, but they may not 
own the real property itself.129 Even those ownership rights, however, are 
constrained by other clauses of the treaty that say that the benefits belong to 
all mankind.130 While the OST allows a constrained claim to space re-
sources, it does not allow the right to exclude under article I’s guarantee of 
free access to all areas of celestial bodies.131 Thus, mining expeditions could 
not lawfully prevent others from entering their area of operation and extract-
ing resources that the expedition worked to discover and expose.   
The issue of real property ownership on celestial bodies has been li-
tigated in federal court. Plaintiff George Nemitz claimed ownership over 
asteroid 433, known as “Eros,” based on the registration of his claim on the 
Archimedes Institute132 website and the use of the asteroid as collateral 
when he filed a Uniform Commercial Code security interest in California.133
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) landed a 
spacecraft on Eros on February 12, 2001.134 Nemitz alleged that NASA’s 
spacecraft on Eros infringed on his property rights, and claimed that he was 
129 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, arts. I–II. 
130 Id. art. 1 
131 Id.
132 The Archimedes Institute is a space policy research group that keeps a Private Property 
Rights Registry where individuals can register private claims to solar system resources.  
Permanent, Archimedes Institute, http://www.permanent.com/ep-archi.htm (last visited Mar. 
14, 2008).  In its decision, the court found “[t]he Archimedes Institute registration on which 
[Nemitz] relies disclaims any authority to confer title or rights to property on its registrants. . 
. . There is absolutely no legal basis for asserting that such a registry creates a property inter-
est in the asteroid.” Nemitz v. U.S., No. 030599, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev., Apr. 26, 
2004), aff’d No. 04-16223, 2005 WL 319010 (9th Cir. 2005). The Institute’s website, 
http://www.permanent.com/archimedes, is apparently defunct. 
133 Nemitz v. U.S., No. 030599, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev., Apr. 26, 2004).  
134 Id.
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entitled to “parking” fees of twenty cents per year.135 When Nemitz con-
tacted NASA to collect this fee, NASA General Counsel Edward Frankle 
responded in a letter by saying: 
Your individual claim of appropriation of a celestial body (the asteroid 433 
Eros) appears to have no foundation in law.  Unlike an individual’s claim 
for seabed minerals, which was considered and debated by the U.S. Con-
gress that subsequently enacted a statute, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resource Act, P.L. 96-283, 94 Stat. 533 (1980), expressly authorizing such 
claims. There is no similar statute related in outer space.136
The Nevada district court agreed with Frankle, granting NASA’s 
motion to dismiss by finding that Nemitz had no property interest in the 
asteroid nor a cognizable cause of action against the defendants.137
Despite the current legal framework barring real property rights in 
space, proponents of full property rights argue that real estate ownership 
would have a number of advantages over other systems, and that new laws 
and treaties must be established to create real property rights on celestial 
bodies. One argument for this position is that allowing ownership of real 
property on celestial bodies would reduce wasteful use of the land. If expe-
ditions were allowed to mine the moon or other celestial bodies without 
ownership rights to the land that they mine, there would be no incentive to 
use the land in a productive way.138 Rather, the expeditions would work to 
extract only what they wanted and in the process potentially destroy other 
useful resources.139 If the expeditions owned the land, however, they would 
have incentive to use it efficiently and carefully consider all of its possible 
uses to maximize the investment.140 Even if the expedition did not extract 
all the possible resources, an owner of celestial property would have an in-
centive to preserve as much as possible to make it attractive to a future buy-
er when the expedition sells the land.141
Ownership rights would also provide incentives for expeditions to 
make the initial treks to the moon. The first expeditions to mine the moon 
are likely to be the costliest, with ventures prospecting sites, setting up 
bases, and generally learning from the initial successes and failures that 
come with being the first humans to work on another celestial body. Ven-
tures that wait, however, will learn from the mistakes of earlier missions 
135 Id.
136 Wayne White,  Nemitz vs. U.S.: the First Real Property Case in United States Courts,
PROC. 47TH COLLOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE, 339, 340 (2004). 
137 See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042, at *2. 
138 See Reinstein, supra note 10, at 75. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
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and benefit from the knowledge that they have acquired. Under the OST, 
later ventures would have access to the initial expeditions’ equipment and 
resources under reciprocity, and the lack of the right to exclude under the 
OST means that the later ventures could mine the same sites that the earlier 
ventures found and started.142
Providing ownership rights to real estate on the moon would pre-
vent these problems. Interested ventures would want to begin their expedi-
tions as soon as possible in order to claim prime real estate and prevent its 
use by others. Absent an agreement with another expedition, they would 
need to establish their own base and provide their own resources, which 
means they gain no advantage by waiting for other ventures to be estab-
lished. Another advantage is that ownership would allow a free market to 
develop in property rights.143 Ventures could buy and sell their facilities in 
space, so ventures which were unsuccessful in their mining or other com-
mercial goals would have residual value in facility and property rights, 
which they could sell to recoup expenses.144
Despite these advantages, full ownership of real estate in space pos-
es some serious problems. Most importantly, full ownership violates article 
II’s “no sovereignty” provision in the Outer Space Treaty.145 While article II 
specifies that “nations” may not claim sovereignty on any celestial body, 
this is accepted to include private individuals as well, as nationals are consi-
dered a part of their country of citizenship and are required to work through 
and with their governments in planning and executing missions to space.146
It would take an amendment to the OST itself to overturn this rule and, 
since it is the fundamental tenet of the treaty, it is almost unthinkable that 
that will happen, and certainly not before the expeditions to the moon begin. 
The proposition of full ownership rights further violates the OST by 
disregarding the concerns of developing nations. If lunar real estate were 
put on the market, only the wealthy, developed nations and their citizens 
would be able to purchase it. If developing nations tried to purchase land 
later when they could afford it, they would be at a disadvantage because the 
prime locations are likely to be taken and the land’s current owners could 
demand whatever price they wanted. This could perpetuate current dispari-
ties of wealth and resources on Earth to the Moon and outer space. Along 
the same lines, ownership of real estate could lead to ventures buying land 
142 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII. 
143 Wayne White, Implications of a Proposal for Real Property Rights in Outer Space,
PROC. 42ND COLLOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE, 366, 370 (1999). 
144 Id. at 370–71. 
145 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. II. 
146 See id. art. VI (“The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by 
the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”). 
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on the moon, not with the intent to use it, but to sell it for a large profit, thus 
skewing the value of the property so it seems to be more than it is actually 
worth.147
D. International Space Station Model 
A big drawback to the models discussed above is that they likely 
could not be implemented before the anticipated missions to the moon are 
made. Establishing a new authoritative body on space property law, decid-
ing on property rights, devising a credit system that nations will agree to, 
and attempting to amend a treaty to which ninety-eight countries have rati-
fied are all propositions that would take a significant amount of time to im-
plement. An alternative to these propositions is a solution modeled on the 
International Space Station (ISS).148   
Rather than create a new body of law to govern the ISS, participat-
ing nations agreed to extend existing national terrestrial law to the station in 
outer space.149 Each member registers its own components of the ISS and 
retains jurisdiction over them subject to provisions of overall station man-
agement.150  Thus, Russian law governs in the sections Russia contributed to 
the space station, and American law governs in the modules that the United 
States supplied. Members may contract among themselves to use a portion 
of the craft belonging to another nation, but by doing so they agree to oper-
ate under foreign law when working in that area of the spacecraft.   
The rights and responsibilities of the parties are set out in a hie-
rarchy of instruments governing the ISS: intergovernmental agreements 
(IGAs), memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and implementing arrange-
ments.151 Participating nations first enter into a series of IGAs to define their 
participation and duties on the ISS.152 The IGAs set out general principles 
for carrying out the cooperative effort, including those governing the par-
ties’ conduct in outer space.153 NASA acts as the hub of the IGAs, and nu-
merous other space agencies signed the agreement.154 Under the IGAs, 
147 See Reinstein, supra note 10, at 81. 
148 Sattler, supra note 66, at 37–38 (discussing the passage of the Commercial Space Act). 
149 See Andre Farand, Legal Environment for the Exploitation of the International Space 
Station (ISS), PROC. 42ND COLLOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE, 8, 8 (1999). 
150 HUDGINS, supra note 46, at 234. 
151 John B. Gantt, The Status of Multilateral Space Agreements in International and United 
States Law, PROC. 45TH COLLOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE, 84, 89 (2003). 
152 HUDGINS, supra note 46, at 233. 
153 Farand, supra note 149, at 9. 
154 See id. Fifteen states are currently parties to the ISS.  Id. They are the United States, 
Russia, Japan, Canada, and eleven member states of the European Space Agency. Id.
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members contribute funds and technology, and each owns some portion of 
the space station.155
Under the IGAs in the hierarchy are individual MOUs between 
NASA and each foreign cooperating agency.156  The MOUs contain detailed 
provision regarding the implementation of ISS cooperation as laid out in the 
IGAs.157 Unlike the IGAs, which are conducted by the States, the MOUs are 
signed by the heads of the space agencies.158 MOUs do not generate new 
rights or obligations, but rather concern details regarding the design, devel-
opment, and operation of the ISS.159 They detail the parties’ roles and re-
sponsibilities, establish the management structure, and ensure effective 
planning and coordination of work between the parties.160 At the bottom of 
the hierarchy of agreements governing the ISS are the implementing ar-
rangements. These relate to how the parties’ rights and obligations under the 
MOUs will be implemented.161
This flexible series of agreements between nations could be used as 
a model for agreements governing lunar mining. Nations could agree to 
work together, each contributing funds and placing technology on the moon 
through its own space agency, and retaining jurisdiction over its structures 
and equipment.162  Once the nations made the initial IGA, there would be no 
need for continued official State involvement, and the individual space 
agencies could make further MOUs among themselves. Nations could es-
tablish bases on the moon and have an exclusive economic zone around 
their base through which other public and private expeditions may pass 
through so long as they do not disturb or remove resources.163 The parties to 
the treaty could make agreements among themselves concerning mining 
locations and regulations without needing the approval of an international 
body. 
There are a number of problems with this model that make it an un-
desirable starting point for establishing property rights in space. First, it 
allows a small number of nations to act together to set precedent for proper-
ty rights in space instead of establishing formal international laws that the 
international community agrees upon. This means that when other nations 
155 Sattler, supra note 66, at 38.   
156 See Gantt, supra note 151, at 89.  
157 See Farand, supra note 149, at 10. 
158 See id.
159 See id. 
160 Gantt, supra note 151, at 92. 
161 Farand, supra note 149, at 10 (discussing the heads of ths space agencies signing MOUs 
containing detailed provisions for implementation of ISS cooperation). 
162 See Sattler, supra note 66, at 39.    
163 Id. at 43. 
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eventually do participate in such activities, they likely will be bound by 
customary law that they did not play a role in shaping and that is disadvan-
tageous to them. Second, it disregards the “common heritage” provision of 
the OST, with developing nations fully excluded and receiving no benefit 
from resources derived from space unless they eventually gain the capacity 
to travel to the moon themselves. Finally, it seems unwise to allow one 
country’s space agency to act as the hub to accessing and participating in 
activities in space when space is supposed to belong to the world as a 
whole. Having individual nations dictate the agreements presents the risk 
that a country may be excluded from participation for any reason:  diplo-
matic problems between the nations, unwillingness to share equipment and 
resources, or pressure from other members. 
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL
Drawing on the strengths of the proposals discussed above, this 
Note suggests a new proposal for governing property rights to outer space 
resources. This proposal falls within the bounds set by the Outer Space 
Treaty and avoids many of the problems that prevented the Moon Treaty 
from being widely ratified. Both developed and developing nations will 
benefit from the proposal. In addition, it encourages the exploration and 
exploitation of resources from space. 
First, an international agreement should be made that clarifies prop-
erty rights on celestial bodies and establishes a limited international body to 
oversee its execution and implementation. The agreement should clearly 
state the rule that the Outer Space Treaty is widely understood to have indi-
rectly stated that: nations, companies, and individuals may not own real 
estate on celestial bodies, but may have property rights to resources they 
derive from the moon or other celestial bodies. Stating this outright in a new 
treaty will prevent the types of ongoing debates that arise from the impre-
cise or ambiguous language of agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty 
and the Moon Agreement.  Since the OST is widely understood to have this 
meaning anyway, nations are likely to assent to this portion of the treaty.  It 
solidifies the rights of expeditions to legally claim the resources they extract 
from the moon, and the knowledge that they are acting within a stable legal 
framework should encourage nations to send expeditions without fear that 
the resources will be confiscated or deemed illegal. 
The agreement should establish an authoritative body to be formed 
under the already existing U.N. Office of Outer Space Affairs. The body 
would serve limited functions, so it would not be overly difficult, time-
consuming, or costly to initiate and maintain. It would have a council on 
which every space-faring nation or nations otherwise involved with a space 
would be guaranteed a seat, with limited seats reserved for developing na-
tions.  The body would serve limited functions in that it would oversee the 
general execution of the agreement and be the contact point for participating 
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nations, but under normal circumstances it would not make everyday deci-
sions regarding which country may use what areas and resources. Instead, 
the credit system would be used. Each nation would be allocated a certain 
number of credits representing tonnage of resources to be extracted from the 
lunar surface for a given period of time. The credits would be allocated to 
all member countries with additional credits given to developing nations.164
The credits would be freely transferable, so nations without space-faring 
capabilities could benefit by selling their credits, leasing them while retain-
ing ownership, or creating novel agreements that benefit the nation.165 Na-
tions may sell their credits to their own citizens, or if all the nation’s credits 
are already in use, facilitate in purchasing them from other nations. Individ-
uals and corporations must still go through the appropriate channels in their 
nation, per the OST, because it is the nation that is ultimately responsible 
for their safety and actions.166
The members of the new space property treaty will need to deter-
mine what exactly the credits represent. For example, particular plots of 
land on the moon could be permanently tied to a particular nation’s credits, 
or the credits may represent tonnage that has no fixed location until a nation 
extracts it on a first come basis. The former would provide some features of 
real property rights and discourage wasteful use the land.167 The latter, how-
ever, seems to better comport with the idea that the moon is the “common 
heritage of mankind” and no section is owned by a nation or person. This 
allows expeditions to prospect freely, as they do under the International 
Seabed Authority,168 and use their credits only when they decide on a loca-
tion to begin extraction. When a nation exercises its credits on land, that 
land will become the exclusive economic zone of that nation, with other 
parties free to pass through as long as they do not disturb it or take resources 
from it. Like the ISS model, nations may collaborate and form agreements 
164 The authority would need to decide how to allocate the credits: equally among member 
countries, adjusted based on population, or in some other fashion.  Developing countries 
should receive more than their proportional share of credits so they might significantly bene-
fit from the system even without directly participating in lunar activities. This complies with 
the “benefit and interest of all countries” provision of the OST. See Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 2, art. I (“The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irres-
pective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all 
mankind.”). 
165 Given the immense value of the helium-3 that nations will extract, the cost of credits 
will likely not make the activity cost-prohibitive.  See supra Part I (assessing the value of 
helium-3).
166 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI. 
167 See supra Part IV.C (arguing that ownership rights discourage wasteful use of land). 
168 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the International Seabed Authority’s prospecting and 
exploration procedures).  
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among themselves regarding particular issues without needing to go through 
the authoritative body so long as the agreements do not violate the overarch-
ing agreement on property rights. 
The natural resources extracted could be taxed by the ton to encour-
age nations not to take more than they need and to fund the operations of the 
authority governing the new agreement. There may even be a time or ton-
nage limit for staying on a piece of land so that particularly rich areas of 
resources will not be monopolized by any one country without giving other 
nations the opportunity to compete. Additionally, the authority may estab-
lish environmental rules to ensure that the mining does not harm the envi-
ronment and that the mining and its effects would not be visible from earth.   
Any conflicts arising from lunar activities would be governed by ar-
ticle XIII of the Outer Space Treaty, which calls for issues regarding outer 
space to be resolved between State parties to the treaty or between a party 
and the international organization that oversees the activities.169 Applying 
that provision to this legal framework, if member parties have a dispute they 
must first try to resolve the issues through independent negotiation or by 
working with the authoritative body. Further, article III of the OST states 
that parties shall comply with international law, including the U.N. char-
ter.170 The implication is that disputes arising in space law should be re-
solved in the same way as disputes in other areas of international law.171
Chapter IV of the U.N. charter states that parties shall “seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their 
own choice.”172  If such action is successful, chapter XIV of the U.N. Char-
ter provides that nations may bring their disputes to the International Court 
of Justice or make agreements to bring their issues to another tribunal.173   
Therefore, in the event of a dispute under this legal framework the 
parties must first negotiate between themselves to resolve it. For the fore-
seeable future, there will likely not be enough space activity to necessitate a 
special space law tribunal, and if parties are unable to successfully resolve 
their dispute through diplomatic channels they may bring their dispute to the 
International Court of Justice. If at some future time there is enough space 
activity and disputes that an international space tribunal is necessary, one 
may be created at that time.  
169 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII. 
170 Id. art. III. 
171 H. L. VAN Traa-Engelman, Commercial Utilization of Outer Space: Law and Practice
343 (1993).
172 U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. 
173 See U.N. Charter arts. 92, 95. 
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This legal framework should ensure that all of mankind benefits 
from the natural resources of outer space while operating under an efficient 
system that encourages exploration and use of resources without the system 
itself becoming burdensome. 
CONCLUSION
The plans of five nations to go to the moon within the next ten years 
and extract helium-3—a substance that could change the way the world gets 
its energy—illustrates the urgent need to form a clear, stable legal frame-
work to govern property rights regarding natural resources in space. A sta-
ble legal framework will encourage progress by assuring expeditions that 
they will legally own the resources they extract. It will also prevent ventures 
from setting bad precedent by performing expeditions outside of firmly es-
tablished international law. The proper framework may even help nations 
that will not directly be participating in missions to the moon, in compliance 
with the Outer Space Treaty’s provision that the operations benefit all of 
mankind. 
Under this proposal, an authoritative body would oversee the space 
property laws, act as a point of contact between nations, and act as a forum 
for proposing and discussing space property law. The credit system would 
depend on individual contracting between nations, so the body would not 
generally be involved in everyday affairs of reviewing and approving pro-
posals. Nations must merely alert the council before exercising their credits 
to ensure that that area is not already being used by another nation. Short of 
enforcing environmental rules, the council would otherwise only be directly 
involved in operations when resolving disputes. In short, the plan should 
appeal to all nations and benefit all of mankind while encouraging man-
kind’s next giant leap. 
